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ABSTRACT 
For two decades, courts in the Ninth Circuit enforced the so-called 
Federal Defendant Rule, under which intervention as of right was 
prohibited in cases brought under the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA). The Ninth Circuit eventually abandoned this rule in its 
2011 en banc decision in Wilderness Society v. U.S. Forest Service. 
This Article traces the history of the Federal Defendant Rule, showing 
how it evolved through a common law-like process from a fact-
specific decision in one case to a bright-line rule. It also explains how, 
despite the Rule’s apparent clarity, it produced confusion in the 
district courts of the Ninth Circuit, leading to a series of inconsistent 
decisions. The Article concludes that the Ninth Circuit was right to 
reject the Rule and uses the history of the Rule to draw more general 
lessons about the processes through which judicial doctrines emerge, 
evolve, and are abandoned. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Ninth Circuit’s 2011 decision in Wilderness Society v. U.S. 
Forest Service1 brought an end to that court’s 20-year experiment 
with the Federal Defendant Rule (FDR or Rule), under which 
intervention as of right under Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) was categorically prohibited at the merits stage of 
 
1 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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cases brought under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2 
The court’s rationale for the Rule was that intervenors could not have 
a significantly protectable interest in a NEPA case because that statute 
imposes only procedural duties on the government. As the court put it 
in one decision: “[B]ecause NEPA requires action only by the 
government, only the government can be liable under NEPA.  A 
private party cannot ‘comply’ with NEPA, and, therefore, a private 
party cannot be a defendant in a NEPA compliance action.”3 
In Wilderness Society, the en banc court unanimously rejected the 
FDR, holding that “courts need no longer apply a categorical 
prohibition on intervention on the merits, or liability phase, of NEPA 
actions.”4 Instead, the court held that judges in the Ninth Circuit 
should, in NEPA cases, apply a “contextual, fact-specific inquiry as to 
whether private parties meet the requirements for intervention [as] of 
right on the merits, just as they do in all other cases.”5 Now, in the 
Ninth Circuit, as in most others, “[a] putative intervenor will 
generally demonstrate a sufficient interest for intervention [as] of 
right in a NEPA action, as in all cases, if ‘it will suffer a practical 
impairment of its interests as a result of the pending litigation.’”6 
The Federal Defendant Rule was an anomaly in the jurisprudence 
of intervention and the Ninth Circuit was correct to reject it. To 
understand both how the Rule lasted as long as it did, and the reasons 
for its eventual demise, this Article recaps the birth, growth, and death 
of the Rule. 
Part I of this Article sets out the basic rules governing intervention 
in the federal courts. Part II then describes the history of the FDR, 
covering both the official history of the Ninth Circuit cases that 
clarified the scope of the Rule over time, and the secret history of the 
district court cases that exposed the Rule’s tensions and 
 
2 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006). 
3 Churchill Cnty. v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 1998). 
4 630 F.3d at 1176. 
5 Id. at 1180. 
6 Id. The only other circuit to have adopted an approach akin to the FDR is the Seventh 
Circuit, which has held that in all cases “brought to require compliance with federal 
statutes regulating governmental projects, the governmental bodies charged with 
compliance can be the only defendants.” Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 185 (7th 
Cir. 1982) (per curiam). All other circuits that have addressed intervention in suits against 
government agencies do not apply this categorical approach. See WildEarth Guardians v. 
U.S. Forest Serv., 573 F.3d 992 (10th Cir. 2009); Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 
964 (3d Cir. 1998); Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202 (5th Cir. 1994); Wilderness Soc’y v. 
Morton, 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam). 
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inconsistencies. Part III chronicles the Ninth Circuit’s eventual 
abandonment of the Rule in Wilderness Society. Finally, Part IV 
identifies some lessons that can be gleaned from this history: the 
correctness of the Ninth Circuit’s decision to abandon the Rule; the 
irony that it did so just when changes in another doctrinal area 
reduced the significance of the Rule; the idea that judicial doctrines 
need advocates as much as public policy positions do if they are to 
survive; and the Rule’s history as a textbook demonstration of some 
of the main models of the development of common law doctrines. 
I 
INTERVENTION UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there are two forms of 
intervention: intervention as of right and permissive intervention. A 
court must grant a motion for intervention as of right if the motion is 
“timely” and the applicant “claims an interest relating to the property 
or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that 
disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the 
movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties 
adequately represent that interest.”7 Courts generally rephrase the rule 
into the following four-part test: 
(1) the motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must claim a 
“significantly protectable” interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must 
be so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical 
matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (4) 
the applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by the 
parties to the action.8 
If a court finds that the movant satisfies all four parts of the test, then 
it must allow the movant to intervene. 
By contrast, under permissive intervention, a court may grant a 
motion to intervene if the motion is timely and the applicant “has a 
claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question 
of law or fact.”9 The test for permissive intervention is considerably 
less stringent than that for intervention as of right, but the district 
 
7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). 
8 Sierra Club v. U.S. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993), abrogated by 
Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011). 
9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1). 
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court judge also retains significant discretion in deciding whether to 
allow a movant to intervene, even if the test is satisfied.10 A party 
 
10 Appellate review of permissive intervention decisions is highly deferential, generally 
being carried out pursuant to an “abuse of discretion” or “clear abuse of discretion” 
standard. As the First Circuit put it in one decision, “the district court enjoys broad 
discretion in making determinations regarding permissive intervention under Rule 
24(b)(2). Reversal of a district court’s denial of permissive intervention on grounds of 
abuse of discretion is ‘so unusual as to be almost unique.’” Travelers Indem. Co. v. 
Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629, 641 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Benjamin ex rel. Yock v. Dep’t of 
Pub. Welfare of Pa., 701 F.3d 938, 947 (3d Cir. 2012); McHenry v. Comm’r., 677 F.3d 
214, 219 (4th Cir. 2012); Blount-Hill v. Zelman, 636 F.3d 278, 287 (6th Cir. 2011); City 
of Colorado Springs v. Climax Molybdenum Co., 587 F.3d 1071, 1078 (10th Cir. 2009); 
Fox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 519 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008); AT & T Corp. v. Sprint 
Corp., 407 F.3d 560, 561 (2d Cir. 2005); Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th 
Cir. 2005); Standard Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 137 F.3d 
567, 573 (8th Cir. 1998); In re Vitreous Steel Products Co., 911 F.2d 1223, 1231 (7th Cir. 
1990); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 471 (5th 
Cir. 1984). Review of trial court decisions on motions to intervene as of right is usually 
less deferential. Several circuit courts review timeliness determinations for abuse of 
discretion, but subject other aspects of the district court’s decision to de novo review. See, 
e.g., In re Uponor, Inc., F1807 Plumbing Fittings Products Liab. Litig., 716 F.3d 1057, 
1065 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[O]ur court generally reviews de novo whether or not a person is 
entitled to intervention as a matter of right. When a district court denies a motion to 
intervene based on untimeliness, however, we review that decision for abuse of 
discretion.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Defenders of Wildlife v. 
Perciasepe, 714 F.3d 1317, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“We review the denial of a motion to 
intervene de novo for issues of law, for clear error as to findings of fact and for abuse of 
discretion on issues that involve a measure of judicial discretion.”) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); City of Emeryville v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1251, 1259 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“We review a district court’s decision allowing intervention as of right pursuant to 
Rule 24(a) de novo, except for the element of timeliness, which we review for an abuse of 
discretion.”); Coal. of Ariz./N.M. Cntys. for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep’t of Interior, 100 
F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1996) (“We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s 
rulings on the timeliness of an application for intervention as of right, but we review de 
novo a district court’s rulings on the three remaining requirements under Rule 24(a)(2).”); 
United States v. Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 923 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The de 
novo standard governs review of district court rulings on all Rule 24(a) requirements 
except for timing.”); Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1989) (adopting abuse 
of discretion review for timeliness and de novo review for other Rule 24(a)(2) factors). 
The Eleventh Circuit and D.C. Circuit adopt variations upon this approach. See Fox, 519 
F.3d at 1301 (“We review the denial of a motion to intervene of right de novo. We review 
subsidiary findings of fact for clear error.”) (citation omitted). Some other circuits use an 
abuse of discretion standard for all aspects of Rule 24(a) decisions, but usually specify that 
they grant additional deference to permissive intervention decisions. See, e.g., Yock, 701 
F.3d at 947 (“This Court reviews a district court’s denial of permissive intervention and 
intervention of right for abuse of discretion but applies a more stringent standard to denials 
of intervention of right.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); AT & T Corp., 
407 F.3d 560, 561 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We review a denial of intervention for abuse of 
discretion. When a district court denies permissive intervention, our review is particularly 
deferential.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. 
Patch, 136 F.3d 197, 204 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Although we review the district court’s  
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seeking to intervene will usually move for both intervention as of 
right and permissive intervention. 
Under the generally trans-substantive approach of the FRCP,11 
these standards are supposed to apply to all federal civil litigation. In 
other words, the same rules governing intervention apply regardless 
of the nature of the substantive issues at stake in the litigation or the 
identity of the parties. 
II 
THE FEDERAL DEFENDANT RULE 
A. Origins: Portland Audubon v. Hodel 
The Federal Defendant Rule had its roots in the Ninth Circuit’s 
1989 decision in Portland Audubon Society v. Hodel.12 This case was 
part of the lengthy and multifaceted dispute that played out in the late 
1980s and early 1990s relating to the protection of the northern 
spotted owl and the management of old growth forests in the Pacific 
Northwest. In this case, a coalition of environmental organizations 
sued the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to halt timber sales in 
old growth forests near spotted owl nesting sites. They brought claims 
under several statutes, including NEPA. In particular, the plaintiffs 
argued that the BLM should have prepared a supplemental 
environmental impact statement (EIS) for seven timber management 
plans because of significant new information about the status of the 
northern spotted owl.13 
The Northwest Forest Resource Council (NFRC), a timber industry 
group, moved to intervene as of right as a defendant in the litigation. 
The district court granted the NFRC’s motion as to some of the 
plaintiffs’ claims, but denied it as to the NEPA claim. Citing a 
Seventh Circuit decision, Wade v. Goldschmidt,14 the district court 
 
intervention decisions for abuse of discretion, that discretion is more circumscribed when 
Rule 24(a) is in play.”) (citations omitted); cf. Sierra Club v. S.C., 945 F.2d 776, 779 (4th 
Cir. 1991) (“We review the denial of a motion for intervention on abuse of discretion 
grounds.”). 
11 See generally David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in 
Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371 (2010); Stephen N. Subrin, The 
Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” 
Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377 (2010). 
12 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1989). 
13 Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Hodel, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20366 (D. Or. Jan. 29, 1988). 
14 673 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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held that “when the focus of a proceeding is whether governmental 
bodies charged with compliance with a statute have satisfied the 
federal statutory procedural requirements in making administrative 
decisions, the government bodies charged with compliance can be the 
only defendants.”15 
The NFRC appealed the denial of its motion to intervene and the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court began by citing the four-part test for 
deciding motions for intervention as of right, quoted above.16 The key 
issue in this case, the court held, was whether the proposed 
intervenors satisfied the second prong of the test: that they “asserted 
an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject 
of the action.” As explained by the Supreme Court, this “interest” 
must be a “significantly protectable interest,”17 although in the Ninth 
Circuit it need not be any “specific legal or equitable interest.”18 
The court went on to conclude that the NFRC did not have the 
requisite “significantly protectable interest” in this case—a holding 
for which Portland Audubon is traditionally cited as the first FDR 
case. Yet a close reading of the case shows that it did not state this 
rule clearly. Instead, the court’s decision in Portland Audubon was 
open to multiple interpretations, and these competing visions of the 
decision would play out over the next twenty years of FDR cases in 
the Ninth Circuit, culminating in Wilderness Society. Generally, there 
are five possible interpretations of the decision. 
1. First Interpretation: Adopting the Wade Rule 
The first possible reading of Portland Audubon is that it adopted 
wholesale the Wade rule from the Seventh Circuit. Much of the 
opinion, which quotes Wade at length, lends itself to this 
interpretation. Under the Wade approach, any time a suit seeks only to 
require that a federal agency comply with its procedural duties under 
a statute, a party other than the agency defendant cannot have a 
“significantly protectable interest.” Because such a suit cannot 
compel any particular substantive outcome of the agency’s decision-
making process, but merely requires the agency to follow the 
appropriate procedures, the interests of other actors are simply not 
implicated. Thus, in Portland Audubon, the timber industry group 
 
15 Portland Audubon Soc’y, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20366. 
16 Portland Audubon Soc’y, 866 F.2d at 308; see supra text accompanying note 8. 
17 Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971). 
18 Cnty. of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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could have no cognizable interest in the plaintiffs’ NEPA claim. The 
court could not order the agency to adopt any specific approach to 
timber sales on BLM lands. Instead, a victory for the plaintiffs would 
mean only that the BLM had to prepare a supplemental EIS. 
2. Second Interpretation: Prudential Standing for Intervenors 
Under a second interpretation of the decision in Portland Audubon, 
potential intervenors must show that their interests are related to the 
statute that is the basis for the lawsuit, in a manner akin to the zone of 
interests test for prudential standing.19 After quoting Ward, the court 
noted two earlier Ninth Circuit decisions in which the court had 
granted motions to intervene.20 The difference, according to the court, 
was that in those cases, the intervenors’ interests related “to the 
interests intended to be protected by the statute at issue.”21 In 
Portland Audubon, by contrast, the timber industry organization 
asserted only economic interests: “NEPA provides no protection for 
the purely economic interests that they assert. Although the 
intervenors have a significant economic stake in the outcome of the 
plaintiffs’ case, they have pointed to no ‘protectable’ interest 
justifying intervention as of right.”22 
Despite the obvious similarities between this test and the zone of 
interests test, the court denied that it was imposing a requirement that 
 
19 Under this test, the Ninth Circuit had held at the time of Portland Audubon, and 
continues to hold, that a plaintiff asserting purely economic interests does not have 
standing to bring a case under NEPA. See, e.g., Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 
420 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2005); Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United 
Stockgrowers of Am. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1103 (9th Cir. 2005); Nev. 
Land Action Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1993); Port of Astoria v. 
Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 475 (9th Cir. 1979). Because NEPA is intended to protect 
environmental interests, a plaintiff asserting only economic interests is not within the zone 
of interests protected by the statute. 
The Supreme Court recently departed from its practice of referring to the zone of interests 
test as an aspect of prudential standing. Instead, the Court now instructs, “[w]hether a 
plaintiff comes within the zone of interests is an issue that requires us to determine, using 
traditional tools of statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of 
action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014). This Article nevertheless continues to 
refer to the zone of interests as one for prudential standing because that was the 
terminology used by the courts during the time the Ninth Circuit developed and then 
rejected the Federal Defendant Rule. 
20 Portland Audubon Soc’y, 866 F.2d at 309 (citing Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 
713 F.2d 525, 526–28 (9th Cir.1983) and Cnty. of Fresno, 622 F.2d at 437–38). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
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“a party seeking to intervene must have standing.”23 Thus, the court 
did not require the proposed intervenor to meet the tripartite 
constitutional test of injury in fact, causation, and redressability. By 
equating a protectable interest with an interest protected by NEPA, 
however, the court arguably imported—its protestations to the 
contrary notwithstanding—the zone of interests aspect of prudential 
standing into the test for intervention as of right. Indeed, the Ninth 
Circuit cited Portland Audubon for precisely that proposition in an 
unpublished decision in 1992.24 
3. Third Interpretation: Insufficiently Concrete Interests 
A third possible interpretation of Portland Audubon focuses not 
upon the nature of the proposed intervenors’ interests but on whether 
they were sufficiently concrete to justify intervention. This 
interpretation admittedly does not receive much support from the 
 
23 Id. at 308 n.1. The Supreme Court in a 1986 case declined to rule on whether 
intervenors must demonstrate standing, see Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68–69 
(1986), and there is currently a circuit split on the issue. Along with the Ninth Circuit, the 
Second, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that an intervenor need not 
establish standing. See San Juan Cnty., Utah v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th 
Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v. Tennessee, 260 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2001); Ruiz 
v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 830 (5th Cir. 1998); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 
(11th Cir. 1989); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir. 1978). By 
contrast, the Eighth and D.C. Circuits have held that that an intervenor must independently 
satisfy both the requirements of Rule 24 and standing. See In re Endangered Species Act 
Section 4 Deadline Litig., 704 F.3d 972, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 
630 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 
833 (8th Cir. 2009). The Seventh Circuit has avoided ruling on the question by 
determining that “‘[a]ny interest of such magnitude [as to support Rule 24(a) intervention 
of right] is sufficient to satisfy the Article III standing requirement as well.’” Sokaogon 
Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Transamerica Ins. 
Co. v. South, 125 F.3d 392, 396 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997)). On the question of whether standing 
should be required to intervene, see generally Elizabeth Zwickert Timmermans, Note, Has 
the Bowsher Doctrine Solved the Debate?: The Relationship Between Standing and 
Intervention as of Right, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1411 (2009); Eric S. Oelrich, Note, The 
Relationship Between Standing and Intervention: The Tenth Circuit Answers by 
“Standing” Down, 14 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 209 (2006); Kerry C. White, Note, 
Rule 24(a) Intervention of Right: Why the Federal Courts Should Require Standing to 
Intervene, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 527 (2002); Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law 
Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 215, 268–72 (2000); Carl 
Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415. 
24 See Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, No. 91-16369, 1992 WL 
354225, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 30, 1992) (holding that “‘purely economic interests’ are not 
sufficient for intervention in a NEPA action under Portland Audubon”); cf. Or. Envtl. 
Council v. Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 775 F. Supp. 353, 358 (D. Or. 1991) (citing 
Portland Audubon to deny intervention in a Clean Air Act case because “[t]he Act does 
not provide direct protection for the economic interests of industries that emit pollutants”). 
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language of the opinion itself. Yet it would not have been an 
implausible basis for denying intervention on the facts of the case. 
The only interest that the NFRC identified, according to the district 
court, was that the companies who made up its constituent industry 
groups “bid on and purchase timber from lands managed by the 
BLM.”25 In other words, it is not clear that the NFRC identified any 
particular timber sale in which its members had a specific property 
interest such as a permit or contract. As discussed below, some later 
Ninth Circuit decisions denied intervention on the basis of such “bare 
expectations.”26 
4. Fourth Interpretation: A NEPA-Specific Rule 
Fourth, the decision might be understood as standing for a NEPA-
specific rule—the eventual form of the FDR. Again, the Portland 
Audubon court itself does not explain its decision in these terms. 
From the perspective of the interests that regulated parties can assert, 
there is no logical basis upon which to distinguish NEPA from other 
statutes that create similar procedural duties for federal agencies. The 
Portland Audubon court went to great trouble to distinguish the facts 
before it from those in two earlier decisions, Sagebrush Rebellion, 
Inc. v. Watt,27 and County of Fresno v. Andrus.28 There would have 
been no need for the Portland Audubon court to distinguish those 
cases if the fact that the case had been brought under NEPA was of 
decisive significance. And yet Portland Audubon would come to 
stand for precisely this NEPA-specific rule. 
5. Fifth Interpretation: All of the Above 
Finally, there is the “all of the above” option. As mentioned earlier, 
decisions on motions to intervene as of right are highly fact-specific. 
Given this characteristic of intervention rulings, there is no reason 
that Portland Audubon had to stand for any broader rule at all. 
Instead, the decision could mean simply that intervention as of right is 
inappropriate when all of the factors implicated by the four rules 
described above are present: the case involves a government agency’s 
procedural duties under NEPA and the proposed intervenors represent 
overly attenuated and non-germane interests. Indeed, it is quite 
 
25 Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Hodel, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20366 (D. Or. 1988). 
26 See infra note 70. 
27 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983). 
28 622 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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possible that today, even after the FDR has been overturned by 
Wilderness Society, a court in the Ninth Circuit would still decide 
Portland Audubon the same way. 
B. The Official History 
Over the next twenty years, the history of the Federal Defendant 
Rule in the Ninth Circuit can be traced in two ways. The first, 
examined in this section, is the official history of the Rule. The 
official history is a series of cases that solidified the Rule’s status as a 
per se rule—applicable only to NEPA cases, only at the merits stage, 
and equally to environmental and economic interests. At the same 
time, however, there was a secret history of the Rule, consisting 
mostly of district court decisions, which threatened to undermine the 
Ninth Circuit’s attempts to build clarity. 
1. Sierra Club v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
The first, and most important, step from the ambiguity of Portland 
Audubon toward a NEPA-specific FDR came four years later in 
Sierra Club v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,29 a Clean 
Water Act (CWA) case. In this case, the Sierra Club and an individual 
alleged that two wastewater treatment plants operated by the City of 
Phoenix discharged toxic pollutants into the Gila and Salt Rivers and 
that the EPA should list those rivers as impaired and impose new 
permit requirements on the plants.30 The City of Phoenix sought to 
intervene in the litigation. The district court denied the City’s motion, 
citing Portland Audubon. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that this case differed 
from Portland Audubon in three relevant ways. First, the City held 
existing National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits for 
the plants—“rights protected by law relating to the property which is 
the subject of the action.”31 By contrast, the interests asserted by the 
proposed intervenors in Portland Audubon amounted to “a bare 
expectation, not anything in the nature of real or personal property, 
contracts, or permits.”32 So far, the court’s analysis was consistent 
with the third interpretation of Portland Audubon identified above—
whether the intervenor’s interests were sufficiently concrete. 
 
29 995 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1993). 
30 Id. at 1480. 
31 Id. at 1482. 
32 Id. 
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Second, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the City 
should be denied intervention because its interests had no relation to 
those protected by the CWA. In doing so, the court disavowed the 
second interpretation of Portland Audubon—the zone of interests test. 
Instead, the Sierra Club court held, it is “generally enough that the 
interest is protectable under some law, and that there is a relationship 
between the legally protected interest and the claims at issue.”33 
Finally, the court announced a new characterization of Portland 
Audubon. For the first time it described that case as announcing a 
NEPA-specific rule (the fourth possible interpretation as identified 
above). Portland Audubon, the court held, was: 
[M]ost plainly distinguished from and reconciled with [other Ninth 
Circuit] cases by understanding it as a NEPA case. Since NEPA 
requires only action by the government, no private party can 
comply with NEPA. It is for that reason that in a lawsuit to compel 
compliance with NEPA, no one but the federal government can be a 
defendant.34 
The CWA, by contrast, does not primarily regulate the EPA, but 
instead regulates the behavior of polluters—private individuals, 
companies, and, of particular relevance in Sierra Club, local 
governments.35 
In sum, this decision strengthened two interpretations of Portland 
Audubon: the bare expectation interpretation and the NEPA-only 
interpretation. Indeed, since Portland Audubon itself makes no 
reference to a NEPA-specific rule, Sierra Club arguably marks the 
true origin of the FDR as subsequently understood. Simultaneously, 
the decision also undermined another plausible reading of Portland 
Audubon, one requiring a zone of interests showing by intervenors. 
 
33 Id. at 1484. The court also added, however, that the City’s interests were in fact 
protected by the Clean Water Act, “[b]ecause the Act protects the interest of a person who 
discharges pollutants pursuant to a permit, and the City of Phoenix owns such permits.” Id. 
at 1485-86. The court thus overruled decisions like Oregon Environmental Council v. 
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, 775 F. Supp. 353 (D. Or. 1991), which—
citing Portland Audubon—had denied intervention as of right to several companies under 
the Clean Air Act (CAA) because the CAA “does not provide direct protection for the 
economic interests of industries that emit pollutants.” Id. at 358. 
34 995 F.2d at 1485. 
35 Id. 
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2. Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Service 
The next FDR case was Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. 
Forest Service.36 This case emphasized the Rule’s focus on an 
agency’s procedural duties by adding the refinement that the Rule 
prohibited intervention only at the merits stage of a case. Under 
Forest Conservation Council, third parties were free to intervene in 
NEPA cases with respect to the remedial portion of the case. 
The case involved a challenge by several environmental groups to 
the Forest Service’s failure to complete an EIS for its “guidelines for 
the management of Northern Goshawk habitat on national forest 
lands.”37 The State of Arizona and an Arizona county sought to 
intervene as defendants. The district court denied their motion to 
intervene, relying on Sierra Club’s characterization of Portland 
Audubon as barring intervention in NEPA cases. 
Most of the Ninth Circuit’s decision on appeal reads as a 
renunciation of the FDR. The court emphasized that, like the City of 
Phoenix in Sierra Club and in contrast to the timber industry group in 
Portland Audubon, “the State and County have asserted tangible, 
concrete rights protected by various federal and state laws, as well as 
contracts with the federal government.”38 The injunction sought by 
the plaintiffs implicated those rights and contracts. As a result, the 
court held that “when, as here, the injunctive relief sought by 
plaintiffs will have direct, immediate, and harmful effects upon a third 
party’s legally protectable interests, that party satisfies the ‘interest’ 
test of [FRCP] 24(a)(2).”39 As a result, the court allowed the State and 
County to intervene “in the portion of the proceedings addressing the 
injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs.”40 
Almost as an afterthought—in a footnote at the very end of the 
opinion—the court denied intervention at the merits stage. After 
devoting six pages to explaining in great detail how much the 
outcome of the lawsuit would affect the concrete interests of the 
intervenors, the court’s entire discussion of intervention at the merits 
stage was:  
“Appellants cannot claim any interest that relates to the issue of the 
Forest Service’s liability under NEPA and [the National Forest 
 
36 66 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1995). 
37 Id. at 1491. 
38 Id. at 1495. 
39 Id. at 1494. 
40 Id. at 1499. 
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Management Act]. In that respect, we agree with Sierra Club’s 
statement that ‘in a lawsuit [only] to compel compliance with 
NEPA, no one but the federal government can be a defendant.’”41 
Three key points emerged from Forest Conservation Council. 
First, it indicated that the FDR did not apply at the remedial stage of a 
case. Second, it reaffirmed the vitality of the Rule at the merits stage, 
even applying it to a claim implicating procedural duties under the 
National Forest Management Act (NFMA). Both of these changes 
emphasized the Rule’s focus on an agency’s purely procedural duties. 
Third, it demonstrated that even at the remedial stage, a proposed 
intervenor must show that the remedy implicated its concrete rights or 
contracts. Thus the concreteness interpretation of Portland Audubon 
lived on. However, at the merits stage, such an interest was not 
sufficient to allow intervention. 
3. Churchill County v. Babbitt 
The next Ninth Circuit decision to address the Rule, Churchill 
County v. Babbitt,42 emphasized its NEPA-specific nature and held 
that it had become a bright-line rule rather than a multi-factor test. 
This case involved a challenge by several Nevada municipalities to a 
Department of the Interior water rights acquisition program. The 
plaintiffs argued that the Department should have prepared a 
programmatic EIS before starting the program.43 A local power 
utility, the Sierra Pacific Power Company, moved to intervene as a 
defendant. The district court granted the motion in part, limiting 
Sierra Pacific’s intervention to the remedial phase.44 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The result followed as a 
pure matter of precedent: 
The district court relied on our rule that the federal government is 
the only proper defendant in an action to compel compliance with 
NEPA. The rationale for our rule is that, because NEPA requires 
action only by the government, only the government can be liable 
under NEPA. A private party cannot “comply” with NEPA, and, 
therefore, a private party cannot be a defendant in a NEPA 
compliance action.45 
 
41 Id. at 1499 n.11 (quoting Sierra Club v. U.S. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1485 (9th Cir. 
1993)). 
42 150 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1998). 
43 Id. at 1076. 
44 Id. at 1077. 
45 Id. at 1082 (citations omitted). 
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And that was that. 
4. Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
One issue that Churchill County left unaddressed was whether the 
nature of the intervenor’s interest mattered at all. The court did not 
describe this interest. The parties’ briefs, however, make it clear that 
what was at stake was not a direct interference with any existing 
permit or contractual right, but rather the potential impact of the 
decision on the utility’s future plans for “restructuring the present 
upstream storage and water allocation regime now in place” on the 
Truckee River.46 Churchill County thus potentially left open the 
question whether a more direct interest in the case would suffice for 
intervention on the merits. Furthermore, even though Forest 
Conservation Council had involved intervenors with more direct 
interests, the court’s cursory treatment of intervention as to the merits 
must have left some potential intervenors with the hope that if a 
contractual right or permit was implicated with sufficient directness 
then the outcome would be different. 
Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers47 put to 
rest any such hopes. In that case, two environmental organizations 
challenged the Army Corps of Engineers’ decision to issue an 
Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact, 
rather than an EIS, in connection with the issuance of a dredge-and-
fill permit under section 404 of the CWA.48 The recipient of the 
permit moved to intervene.49 Citing the FDR, the district court limited 
the permit holder’s intervention to the remedial phase with respect to 
the plaintiffs’ NEPA claims.50 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The permit holder argued that the FDR 
did “not apply to NEPA actions involving an attack upon a permit 
issued to a private party.”51 The court found no such exception in its 
precedents and, citing Churchill County, upheld the district court’s 
denial of intervention at the merits stage of the NEPA claim.52 
Therefore, by the time of Churchill County and Wetlands Action 
 
46 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 19, Churchill v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 
1998) (No. 97-15813), 1997 WL 33550630 at *19. 
47 222 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000). 
48 Id. at 1109. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 1113. 
51 Id. at 1114. 
52 Id. 
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Network, the FDR had been clearly established as a rule that applied 
regardless of the concreteness of the interests represented by the 
intervenors. 
5. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman: The Federal Defendant Rule 
for the Gander 
In the vast majority of NEPA cases, the plaintiffs are 
environmental organizations and the proposed defendant-intervenors 
are entities with economic interests that might be harmed by the 
outcome of the plaintiffs’ suit. All of the Ninth Circuit’s FDR cases 
before 2002 followed this pattern.53 One reason the cases are skewed 
in this direction is that plaintiffs asserting only economic interests fail 
the zone of interests test for prudential standing under NEPA.54  Over 
time, however, anti-environmental plaintiffs have grown more 
successful at bringing cases under the federal environmental laws, 
including NEPA.55 One successful strategy is to assert, for standing 
purposes, environmental interests in conjunction with economic ones 
in order to challenge federal agencies’ compliance with NEPA in 
carrying out environmentally protective actions.56  Thus, for example, 
plaintiffs who want to challenge a Forest Service decision that 
restricts timber harvesting can argue that the action will result in more 
insect infestations and forest fires.57 
 
53 As a result, one commentator criticized the Ninth Circuit’s FDR cases as creating a 
“substantial disadvantage” for business interests, arguing that it left them “virtually 
powerless to defend their interests.” Erik Figlio, Note, Stacking the Deck Against “Purely 
Economic Interests”: Inequity and Intervention in Environmental Litigation, 35 GA. L. 
REV. 1219, 1243 (2001). 
54 See, e.g., Am. Independence Mines & Minerals Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 494 F. 
App’x 724, 727 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2766 (2013). 
55 See Stephanie D. Matheny, Who Can Defend a Federal Regulation? The Ninth 
Circuit Misapplied Rule 24 by Denying Intervention of Right in Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. 
Veneman, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2003) (“The Kootenai case is a prominent 
example of a recent litigation trend in which parties opposed to conservation-oriented 
plans and endangered species protections have used NEPA and other federal 
environmental statutes to challenge these programs in court.”). 
56 See Shaun A. Goho, NEPA and the “Beneficial Impact” EIS, 36 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 367, 395–96 (2012) (citing cases). 
57 See, e.g., Cal. Forestry Ass’n v. Bosworth, No. 2:05-cv-00905-MCE-GGH, 2008 WL 
4370074, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2008) (finding that timber industry groups had 
prudential standing to bring a NEPA challenge to a forest plan amendment because they 
identified potential harms to privately-owned forests adjacent to federal land as a result of 
allegedly inadequate thinning of overly dense national forests). 
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One example of such a “NEPA for the Gander”58 suit was Kootenai 
Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman,59 in which an Indian tribe, a pulp-and-
paper company, off-road vehicle users, livestock companies, and two 
Idaho counties challenged the Clinton administration’s “Roadless 
Rule,” which had restricted development in 58.5 million acres of 
National Forest land.60 Several environmental organizations, among 
them the Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 
Wilderness Society, and Defenders of Wildlife, moved to intervene to 
defend the rule.61 
The district court granted the motion, relying on Sagebrush 
Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt,62 a pre-Portland Audubon case in which 
environmental groups had been granted intervention as of right to 
defend the Secretary of the Interior’s decision to remove certain 
public lands from entry. As indicated above, Portland Audubon had 
distinguished Sagebrush Rebellion on the ground that “[t]he 
intervenors’ claim here, unlike those made in Sagebrush Rebellion      
. . ., has no relation to the interests intended to be protected by the 
statute at issue.”63 The district court in Kootenai Tribe noted that 
Sagebrush Rebellion had not been overruled, and that “[t]he 
environmental, conservation and wildlife interests asserted by [the 
intervenors] are necessarily related to the interests intended to be 
protected by the NEPA.”64 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed as to intervention as of right 
under FRCP 24(a). In one paragraph, it rejected intervention as of 
right as a straight matter of precedent: “We read our precedent to hold 
that the private intervenors in this NEPA action may not intervene as 
of right.”65 That the intervenors asserted environmental interests 
rather than economic ones—which the Ninth Circuit had found 
 
58 Jonathan M. Cosco, Note, NEPA for the Gander: NEPA’s Application to Critical 
Habitat Designations and Other “Benevolent” Federal Action, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 345 (1998). 
59 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2002) (abrogated by Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
60 Id. at 1104.  The plaintiffs satisfied the zone of interests test because they asserted 
that land they owned adjacent to national forests would be at greater risk of wildfires and 
insect infestations as a result of the Roadless Rule. Id. at 1112–14. 
61 Id. at 1106 & n.5. 
62 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983). 
63 Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 2011). 
64 Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, No. CV01-10-N-EJL, slip op. at 6 (D. Idaho 
Mar. 14, 2001). 
65 Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, 313 F.3d at 1108. 
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dispositive in Sagebrush Rebellion—was no longer of any 
consequence. The court did, however, uphold the district court’s 
alternative ruling in which it granted permissive intervention under 
FRCP 24(b).66 
6. The Lay of the Land: 2002–2011 
After Kootenai Tribe, the development of the FDR was complete. 
Out of the five possible interpretations of Portland Audubon, only one 
was left standing: a rule that prohibited intervention as of right by any 
and all proposed intervenors in NEPA—and only NEPA—cases.67 
The court’s repeated descriptions of the FDR as a NEPA-specific rule 
were inconsistent with the Wade rule.68 The zone of interests 
interpretation died in Kootenai Tribe, in which environmental 
organizations that would clearly have had prudential standing to bring 
a NEPA claim were denied intervention as of right.69 Similarly, the 
court rejected the concrete interests interpretation in Wetlands Action 
Network, in which a section 404 permit holder was denied 
intervention as of right in a case challenging the Corps’ compliance 
with NEPA in issuing the permit.70 The “all of the above” approach 
 
66 Id. at 1110–11. 
67 At the same time, Kootenai Tribe softened the impact of the Rule. By upholding the 
district court’s grant of permissive intervention, the court left open a path for intervention 
even in cases in which the Federal Defendant Rule applied. Yet, because appellate review 
of permissive intervention decisions is so deferential, see supra note 10, this approach left 
potential intervenors’ fates entirely to the discretion of the trial court judge. 
68 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. EPA, 995 F.2d at 1485; Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, 313 
F.3d at 1108. 
69 In an unpublished decision a year after Kootenai Tribe, the Ninth Circuit reversed a 
district court’s grant of intervention as of right to the Sierra Club in a NEPA case. Alaska 
Forest Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 66 Fed. App’x. 716, 717 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(unpublished decision). 
70 Independently of the Federal Defendant Rule, however, the Ninth Circuit continued 
to distinguish between “bare expectations,” which do not support intervention as of right, 
and property rights such as contracts or permits, which do. See, e.g., United States v. 
Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2004); S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 
F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2002) modified, 307 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002) and certified question 
answered sub nom. S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Peevey, 31 Cal. 4th 781, 74 P.3d 795 (2003); Sw. 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 819 (9th Cir. 2001); Ranchers 
Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of America v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 
143 Fed. App’x 751, 753 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[P]ure economic expectancy is not a legally 
protected interest for purposes of intervention.”) (unpublished opinion); see also Med. 
Protective Co. v. Pang, No. CV 05-2924-PHX-SMM, 2006 WL 1544192, at *4 (D. Ariz. 
June 1, 2006). Similarly, in an unpublished 1995 decision, the Ninth Circuit denied a 
motion to intervene at the remedial stage of an ESA case, distinguishing Forest 
Conservation Council because “the interim injunctive relief in this case, if granted, is not  
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was also incompatible with the Ninth Circuit’s application of the FDR 
as a per se rule that it applied as a pure matter of precedent.71 
C. The Secret History 
Even as the Ninth Circuit appeared to move inexorably toward this 
understanding of the Federal Defendant Rule, a large number of 
district court decisions, and even some decisions of the Ninth Circuit 
itself, tugged the doctrine in different directions. In so doing, these 
decisions revealed the tensions underlying the Rule. 
In particular, three kinds of inconsistencies arose in these cases.  
First, some cases extended the FDR to non-NEPA cases, while others 
did not. Second, some cases looked beyond the NEPA/non-NEPA 
distinction and divided applicable claims from non-applicable based 
on other tests, such as whether the claims were procedural or 
substantive. Third, some cases treated application of the Rule as an 
all-or-nothing decision under which proposed intervenors could either 
join a case as to all claims or as to none of them, while other cases 
applied the Rule to deny intervention as to only some of the plaintiffs’ 
claims. 
1. Expansion of the Rule to Non-NEPA Cases. 
As for the first issue, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, district 
courts in the Ninth Circuit citing the FDR regularly denied motions to 
intervene in cases brought under a variety of other environmental 
statutes, including the Endangered Species Act (ESA),72 Clean Air 
 
likely to impose direct, substantial burdens on appellants’ asserted interests.” Silver v. 
Babbitt, No. 95-15401, 1995 WL 597667, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 1995). 
71 The only potential remaining confusion was between a NEPA-only rule and one 
prohibiting intervention in all cases involving a federal agency’s procedural duties. 
Although Sierra Club had distinguished Portland Audubon on the ground that the latter 
was “a NEPA case,” Sierra Club v. U.S. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1485 (9th Cir. 1993), the 
court had later made a fleeting reference to the plaintiffs’ NFMA claim in Forest 
Conservation Council. Yet, this passing remark aside, every one of the Ninth Circuit’s 
Federal Defendant Rule cases had involved a NEPA claim. 
72 See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lubchenco, No. 09-04087 EDL, 2010 WL 
1038398, at *3–*5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010); WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, No. CV-
09-00574-PHX-FJM, 2009 WL 4270039, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 25, 2009) (denying 
intervention in ESA case); Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Lohn, Civil No. 06-946-KI, 2006 WL 
3762119, at *2 (D. Or. Dec. 20, 2006) (“I find that because the federal agencies are the 
only entities charged with compliance under Section 7 of the ESA, only NMFS and the 
FWS are the proper defendants for purposes of Rule 24(a) intervention as of right.”); Sw. 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074 (D. Ariz. 
2000) (denying intervention as of right by private parties in ESA case); Silver v. Babbitt,  
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Act,73 Plant Protection Act,74 NFMA,75 and other statutes governing 
federal land management.76 During the same period, however, district 
courts also granted motions to intervene as of right in other cases 
brought against federal defendants under many of the same statutes.77 
Indeed, some of these cases even involved NEPA claims.78 
 
166 F.R.D. 418, 428 (D. Ariz. 1994) (“FWS’s duty under the ESA to identify critical 
habitat for the Mexican Spotted Owl is analogous to the government’s duty to prepare an 
environmental impact statement under the NEPA . . . . The applicants’ economic interests 
are not entitled to legal protection in a suit, such as this one, to force a federal agency to 
comply with governmental duties under an environmental law.”). 
73 See Protect Lake Pleasant, LLC v. Johnson, No. CIV 07-454 PHX RCB, 2007 WL 
1108916, at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 13, 2007) (finding the Federal Defendant Rule “to be 
equally applicable to Plaintiffs’ [Federal Property and Administrative Services Act] and 
[Clean Air Act] claims”); cf. Our Children’s Earth Foundation v. U.S. EPA, No. C 05-
05184, 2006 WL 1305223, at *3–*4 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2006) (denying motion to 
intervene of the American Petroleum Institute and the National Petrochemical and 
Refiners Association in a suit challenging EPA’s failure to revise New Source 
Performance Standards within eight-year deadline because they had no protectable interest 
in “whether the Administrator will review the rules and by when he will act on the 
findings of his review”). 
74 See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C10-04038 JSW, 2010 WL 3835699, at *2, 
*6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2010) (denying intervention of right in a case involving NEPA 
claims as well as claims under the Plant Protection Act and the 2008 Farm Bill); Ctr. for 
Food Safety v. Connor, No. C 08-00484 JSW, 2008 WL 3842889, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 
15, 2008) (“The Court finds that the rationale underlying the denial of intervention as of 
right with respect to Plaintiffs’ NEPA claim applies equally to Plaintiffs’ PPA claim. 
Because only the government can comply with the PPA, the Proposed Intervenors do not 
have a significant protectable interest in the merits phase of this environmental compliance 
claim.”). 
75 See Ctr. for Tribal Water Advocacy v. Gutierrez, No. 06-CV-708-SU, 2007 WL 
527932, at *2 (D. Or. Feb. 12, 2007) (holding that the FDR “applies to plaintiff’s claims 
under ESA and NFMA”); Sequoia Forestkeeper v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 1:07cv1690 LJO 
DLB, 2008 WL 324013, at *3–*4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2008); Sierra Nevada Forest Prot. 
Campaign v. Tippin, No. CIV.S-06-00351FCDDAD, 2006 WL 1319397, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 
May 15, 2006) (“Like NEPA, NFMA requires only action by the government . . . . As 
such, under the Ninth Circuit’s rationale, only the government can be a defendant in a 
NFMA compliance action.”). The Ninth Circuit itself, in Forest Conservation Council, had 
in passing applied the Federal Defendant Rule to a NFMA claim. See 66 F.3d 1489, 1499 
n.11 (9th Cir. 1995). 
76 See Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Shuford, No. CIV 06-242-AA, 2006 WL 2601073, at 
*3–*4, *6–*7 (D. Or. Sept. 8, 2006) (denying motions to intervene as to claims brought 
under NEPA, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), the Public 
Rangelands Improvement Act (PRIA), the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, and the Steens 
Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection Act of 2000 because “the statutory 
provisions that form the basis of plaintiff’s claims . . . regulate only the actions of the 
federal government”). 
77 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 266 F.R.D. 369 (D. 
Ariz. 2010) (ESA and NEPA); Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Timchak, No. CV–08–388–
E–MHW, 2008 WL 4911410 (D. Idaho Nov. 13, 2008) (CWA, NFMA, Mineral Leasing 
Act, and NEPA); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, No. C 08-1339 CW, 2008  
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As an initial matter, these decisions reveal that the Ninth Circuit’s 
presentation of the FDR as a NEPA-specific doctrine breaks down as 
soon as you look at the district court cases. It is understandable, 
however, that many district courts extended the Rule to non-NEPA 
cases, given the justifications the Ninth Circuit had provided for the 
Rule. For example, in one case, a district court denied a motion to 
intervene at the merits stage filed by the Arizona Cattle Growers’ 
Association in a case involving the Forest Service’s alleged violation 
of the ESA in issuing grazing permits. The court held that: 
The heart of this legal battle is whether the Forest Service has 
performed its duty to consult in connection with the issuance of 
certain grazing permits. Because only the Forest Service can 
“comply” with this duty, only the Forest Service can and should be 
a defendant for the liability phase of the litigation.79 
As a matter of logic, the court’s position seems unassailable. The 
Ninth Circuit’s stated rationale for the Rule applied equally to cases 
brought to enforce federal agencies’ procedural duties under other 
environmental laws. Nevertheless, as indicated above, in many other 
cases, courts refused to apply the Rule and allowed defendant-
intervenors into environmental cases. Whether courts were able to 
arrive at a principled basis for making this distinction is the next issue 
raised by these cases. 
2. Grounds for Distinguishing FDR from non-FDR Cases. 
Those district court decisions that applied the FDR to non-NEPA 
claims distinguished—either explicitly or implicitly—between cases 
 
WL 3822948 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2008) (NEPA and APA); S. Yuba River Citizens League 
v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CIV. S-06-2845 LKK/JFM, 2007 WL 3034887 (E.D. 
Cal. Oct. 16, 2007) (ESA); Modesto Irrigation Dist. v. Gutierrez, No. CIV-F-06-00453 
OWW DLB, 2007 WL 164953, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2007) (ESA); Cal. State Grange 
v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 1:06-CV-00308 OWW DLB, 2006 WL 3147681 
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2006) (ESA); Home Builders Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 
CIV. S-05-629 LKK/GGH, 2006 WL 1455430 (E.D. Cal. May 24, 2006) (ESA); Med. 
Advocates for Healthy Air v. Johnson, No. C 06-0093 SBA, 2006 WL 581089 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 6, 2006) (CAA); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Norton, No. 1:05CV01207 OWW 
TAG, 2006 WL 39094 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2006) (ESA); Cal. State Grange v. Evans, No. 
02-6044-HO, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27696 (D. Or. May 9, 2002) (ESA); Greenpeace 
Found. v. Daley, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (D. Haw. 2000) (ESA and NEPA); Forest 
Guardians v. Thomas, 967 F. Supp. 1536 (D. Ariz. 1997) (NFMA). 
78 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 266 F.R.D. at 369; Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 
2008 WL 3822948; Greenpeace, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. 
79 Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074 (D. 
Ariz. 2000). 
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to which the Rule did or did not apply in at least three different ways. 
First, some cases applied the Rule to claims regarding an agency’s 
procedural duties, while refusing to apply it to claims involving an 
agency’s substantive duties. Second, some cases drew the line 
between claims involving statutory provisions that regulate only 
federal agencies and those involving statutory provisions that also 
regulate private conduct. Third, some cases refused to apply the Rule 
when the plaintiffs had sued a state or local agency in addition to a 
federal agency. To further confuse matters, some cases involved two 
or more of these considerations. 
First, some cases granting intervention specifically drew a 
distinction between substantive and procedural claims, granting 
motions to intervene as to substantive claims. For example, in one 
case in which the plaintiffs claimed that the National Marine Fisheries 
Service’s (NMFS) decision to list a species under the ESA was 
arbitrary and capricious, the court noted that the “applicants seek to 
intervene not only with respect to a challenge to agency procedures, 
but also to the substantive listing decision. As such the applicants 
have a significantly protectable interest that warrants intervention.”80 
In another case, the court distinguished the Ninth Circuit’s FDR 
cases, explaining that: “The Ninth Circuit’s special approach to 
intervention in NEPA cases does not extend to claims alleging 
violations of other environmental laws, at least where the claims 
challenge the substance of a decision made under the laws rather than 
the government’s failure to take an action mandated by the laws.”81 A 
number of other cases arrived at this result, but without explicitly 
invoking the dichotomy between substance and procedure or even 
citing the Rule.82 
Other cases, however, cannot be explained by a distinction between 
substance and procedure. Either they granted intervention to contest 
procedural claims or they denied intervention to contest substantive 
 
80 Cal. State Grange, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27696, at *6. 
81 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 2008 WL 3822948, at *3. 
82 See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 266 F.R.D. at 373, 375; Modesto Irrigation 
Dist., 2007 WL 164953, at *1–*2; Cal. State Grange, 2006 WL 3147681, at *3–*4; 
Greenpeace Foundation, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 1114–15 (granting intervention as to 
substantive ESA and NEPA claims); see also Our Children’s Earth Foundation, v. U.S. 
EPA, No. C 05-05184 WHA, 2006 WL 1305223, at *2–*3 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2006), 
(denying intervention as of right in case alleging that EPA had failed to perform its 
nondiscretionary duty to review emissions standards for existing petroleum refineries 
because “[t]he substantive content of any new regulations is not . . . a subject of this 
lawsuit;” “[i]t concerns instead a process: the agency review of the regulations”). 
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claims. In particular, these cases defined the class of cases to which 
the FDR applied more broadly to include any claim that could be 
brought only against a federal agency. 
A 2010 decision, for example, denied a motion to intervene as of 
right by the State of Alaska in a case challenging NMFS’s failure to 
list the ribbon seal as threatened or endangered under the ESA.83 The 
plaintiffs in that case challenged the substantive adequacy of NMFS’s 
listing decision.84 The court nevertheless relied upon the Rule as one 
reason to deny intervention, highlighting that the “[p]laintiffs’ sole 
claim is that [the d]efendants acted unlawfully in making their listing 
determination under Section 4 of [the] ESA, a provision that does not 
even apply to the activities of private parties.”85 In another case, 
which challenged the adequacy of three biological opinions, the court 
denied a motion to intervene, finding “that because the federal 
agencies are the only entities charged with compliance under Section 
7 of the ESA, only NMFS and the [Fish and Wildlife Service] are the 
proper defendants for purposes of [FRCP] 24(a) intervention as of 
right.”86 
This approach could lead to results inconsistent with those in the 
cases that relied on the substance/procedure dichotomy. For example, 
consider a case challenging an ESA listing decision. In several such 
cases, district courts granted motions to intervene, relying on the 
characterization of plaintiffs’ claims as substantive.87 Under an 
approach that focused on whether a claim could be brought only 
against a federal agency, however, these intervention motions would 
have been denied—as occurred in the ribbon seal case mentioned in 
the previous paragraph. 
 
83 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lubchenco, No. 09-04087 EDL, 2010 WL 1038398, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010).  The court granted permissive intervention, but only as to 
remedy. Id. at *11. 
84 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Cal. 
2010). 
85 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 2010 WL 1038398, at *3. 
86 Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Lohn, Civil No. 06-946-KI, 2006 WL 3762119, at *2 (D. 
Or. Dec 20, 2006); see also Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Shuford, No. CIV 06-242-AA, 
2006 WL 2601073, at *3–*4 (D. Or. Sept. 8, 2006) (denying intervention because “the 
statutory provisions that form the basis of plaintiff’s claims—NEPA, FLPMA, PRIA, the 
Taylor Grazing Act, and the Steens Act—regulate only the actions of the federal 
government.”). 
87 See, e.g., Cal. State Grange v. Evans, No. 02-6044-HO, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
27696, at *6 (D. Or. May 9, 2002). 
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Finally, some cases concluded that the Rule did not apply when the 
original defendants in the case included entities other than federal 
agencies. For example, two district court decisions, in denying 
intervention based on the FDR, distinguished the cases before them 
(in which the only defendants were federal agencies) from a case in 
which “[a] non-federal defendant’s compliance with the ESA was . . . 
directly at issue,”88 or “the case . . . was not limited to the compliance 
of the federal government.”89 
3. All or Nothing? 
Cases such as these, which distinguished between claims to which 
the FDR applied and those to which it did not, raised a third issue: 
whether the Rule applied claim-by-claim. Should intervention be 
denied under the FDR as to certain claims even if the applicant was 
granted intervention as to other claims, to which the Rule did not 
apply? On this issue, too, the district court cases were divided. 
Some analyzed motions to intervene on a claim-by-claim basis. In 
a particularly clear example of this approach, a 2008 decision out of 
the Northern District of California granted motions to intervene as to 
the plaintiffs’ substantive ESA and Marine Mammal Protection Act 
claims, but denied them as to a NEPA claim and an Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) claim, alleging that the defendants had 
improperly promulgated a rule without following notice-and-
comment procedures.90 This was, of course, the approach that the 
district court had followed in Portland Audubon.91 
Others, however, allowed intervention as to all claims as long as 
there were at least some claims to which the Rule did not apply. Thus, 
one district court decision observed that, “[i]n an action brought 
solely under NEPA, private parties may not intervene as of right in the 
 
88 Or. Natural Desert Ass’n, 2006 WL 3762119, at *3. 
89 Ctr. for Food Safety v. Connor, No. C 08-00484 JSW, 2008 WL 3842889, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2008). 
90 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, No. C 08-1339 CW, 2008 WL 3822948, 
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2008); see also Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, 222 F.3d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) abrogated by Wilderness Soc. v. U.S. 
Forest Service, 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (reviewing district court decision that had 
granted intervention as of right as to Clean Water Act claims but denied it as to NEPA 
claims). 
91 Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming district 
court decision that had denied intervention as to NEPA claim while granting intervention 
as to other claims). 
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merits phase of a proceeding.”92 The court went on to conclude that 
“[h]ere, however, Plaintiffs’ claims also involve substantive violations 
under the [CWA] and [NFMA] in addition to the NEPA procedural 
violations” and therefore granted the motion to intervene as a whole.93  
Most cases arriving at this result were not so explicit in their 
reasoning; instead, these decisions simply granted motions to 
intervene in cases involving substantive claims and/or additional, 
non-federal defendants while citing non-FDR Ninth Circuit 
precedents.94 
4. Ninth Circuit Origins 
Despite the apparent clarity of the Ninth Circuit case law, as 
described above, at least some of the confusion reflected in these 
district court cases can be traced back to decisions of the Ninth 
Circuit from this period. Take the first issue—whether the FDR 
applies only to NEPA claims. On the one hand, the court repeatedly 
described the Rule as applying specifically to NEPA.95 On the other, 
the court extended the Rule to a NFMA claim in a footnote in Forest 
Conservation Council.96 
On the second issue—how to distinguish between claims to which 
the Rule applied or did not apply—the Ninth Circuit again sent 
conflicting signals. A number of its FDR precedents highlighted the 
fact that only government agencies can be sued under NEPA.97 This 
 
92 Greater Yellowstone Coal., v. Timchak, No. CV-08-388-E-MHW, 2008 WL 
4911410, at *3 n.1 (D. Idaho Nov. 13, 2008) (emphasis added). 
93 Id. (emphasis added). 
94 See, e.g., S. Yuba River Citizens League, v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CIV. 
S-06-2845 LKK/JFM, 2007 WL 3034887, at *13–*14 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2007); Cal. State 
Grange v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 1:06-CV-00308 OWW DLB, 2006 WL 
3147681, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2006); Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Serv., No. CIV. S-05-629 LKK/GGH, 2006 WL 1455430, at *3, *4 (E.D. Cal. 
May 24, 2006). 
95 See, e.g., Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (“As a general 
rule, ‘the federal government is the only proper defendant in an action to compel 
compliance with NEPA.’”) (quoting Churchill Cnty. v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th 
Cir. 1998); Sierra Club v. U.S. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1485 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Portland 
Audubon is most plainly distinguished from and reconciled with these cases by 
understanding it as a NEPA case.”). 
96 66 F.3d 1489, 1499 n.11 (9th Cir. 1995). 
97 See Churchill Cnty., 150 F.3d at 1082 (“The rationale for our rule is that, because 
NEPA requires action only by the government, only the government can be liable under 
NEPA. A private party cannot ‘comply’ with NEPA and, therefore, a private party cannot 
be a defendant in a NEPA compliance action.”); accord Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v.  
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rationale does not appear to distinguish between procedural and 
substantive claims. And if one looks at the specific claims raised in 
these cases, at least some of them appear to be better characterized as 
substantive than procedural. In Churchill County and Forest 
Conservation Council, the plaintiffs challenged the defendants’ 
failure to prepare an EIS or programmatic EIS,98 a claim that seems 
procedural in nature. Kootenai Tribe, however, involved both 
procedural claims (whether the agency had complied with the APA’s 
notice and comment requirements) and substantive ones (whether the 
conclusions in the agency’s EIS were arbitrary and capricious).99 
In a 1995 case, by contrast, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the 
distinction between substantive and procedural claims, concluding 
that it was appropriate to allow intervention as of right for substantive 
claims. The case, Idaho Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt,100 
involved a challenge to the Fish and Wildlife Service’s (FWS) 
decision to list the Bruneau Hot Springs Snail as endangered under 
the ESA. Two environmental organizations, Idaho Conservation 
League and Committee for Idaho’s High Desert, moved to intervene 
as of right. The district court granted the motion and the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.101 In doing so, the court emphasized that, although the 
plaintiff had appealed only the district court’s decision on its 
procedural claim, it had originally brought both procedural and 
substantive claims. Thus, the court concluded, the intervenors “were 
not seeking intervention in a case challenging only agency 
procedure.”102 
Idaho Farm Bureau is also relevant to the final issue—whether a 
court should deny intervention only when the FDR would bar 
intervention as to all of the plaintiffs’ claims, or whether a court 
should use the Rule to deny intervention only as to the subset of 
claims to which it was applicable. As indicated above, Idaho Farm 
Bureau allowed intervention as to all claims, as long as some of them 
were substantive. 
 
Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1198 (9th Cir. 2002); Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 
1114. 
98 Churchill Cnty., 150 F.3d at 1076; Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1491. 
99 Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, 313 F.3d at 1115–24. 
100 58 F.3d 1392 (9th Cir. 1995). 
101 Id. at 1395, 1397–98. 
102 Id. at 1398 n.3. 
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In a similar vein was a 2001 decision, Southwest Center for 
Biological Diversity v. Berg.103 The case involved several procedural 
and substantive ESA claims brought against the FWS, the Department 
of the Interior, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the City of San 
Diego.104 The court focused on the directness of the proposed 
intervenors’ contractual interests and did not even mention the FDR 
or its significance to intervention in the context of the plaintiffs’ 
procedural ESA claims.105 Instead, it granted intervention as to all 
claims. 
In other cases, however, the Ninth Circuit either adopted, or 
implicitly approved of, district court decisions granting intervention 
as to some claims but not as to others. For example, in Portland 
Audubon, the district court granted intervention as to the plaintiffs’ 
non-NEPA claims.106 
These cases reveal that, before Wilderness Society, the apparent 
clarity of the Ninth Circuit’s Federal Defendant Rule masked 
significant ambiguities and conflicts. Did it apply only to procedural 
NEPA challenges, or to all NEPA challenges? Did it apply to all 
procedural claims against federal agencies, or only to procedural 
claims under NEPA? If the Rule applied to some of the plaintiffs’ 
claims but not to others, should the proposed intervenor be allowed 
into the case as to some issues but not as to others? Or was it 
sufficient to allow the intervenor into the case that it could show that 
the Rule did not apply to at least one of the plaintiffs’ claims? District 
court cases reached contradictory outcomes on all of these issues. 
III 
THE FEDERAL DEFENDANT RULE’S UNLAMENTED DEMISE 
The life of the Federal Defendant Rule came to an abrupt end with 
the en banc decision in Wilderness Society. This case started out as an 
unlikely candidate for abandoning the FDR. The plaintiffs, the 
Wilderness Society and Prairie Falcon Audubon, Inc., challenged a 
Forest Service decision designating trails for off-road vehicle (ORV) 
use in the Sawtooth National Forest in Idaho, raising NEPA, NFMA, 
 
103 268 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001). 
104 Id. at 816–17.  In an amended complaint, the plaintiffs had dropped claims under the 
CWA and NEPA. Id. at 817. 
105 Id. at 820–21. 
106 Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Hodel, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20366 (D. Or. Jan. 29, 1988). 
GOHO (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2014  8:21 AM 
494 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 29, 467 
CWA, and APA claims.107 Their underlying concern was that the 
Forest Service allowed too much ORV use in the forest. 
Several groups of recreational ORV users moved to intervene. 
They did not defend the substance of the agency’s NEPA decision, 
however. Instead, they filed cross-claims, arguing that the Forest 
Service was allowing too little ORV use. As to the plaintiffs’ claims, 
the recreational groups did not seek to defend the agency’s decision 
on the merits; instead, they merely wanted to be heard as to the 
remedy if the plaintiffs prevailed. Their motion to intervene, however, 
was not explicitly limited to the remedy phase of the plaintiffs’ NEPA 
claim. 
The plaintiffs opposed the recreational groups’ motion, arguing 
that the FDR applied both to their NEPA claim and to their non-
NEPA claims because the alleged NFMA, CWA, and APA violations 
arose under statutory provisions that applied only to the federal 
government.108 The district court denied the motion to intervene.109 
After the district court denied a motion for reconsideration, the 
recreational groups appealed. On appeal, the recreational groups, 
supported by a number of amici, challenged not only the district 
court’s application of Ninth Circuit precedent, but also asked the 
court to overrule the FDR.110 In response, the plaintiffs defended the 
district court’s application of the Rule, but took “no position 
regarding the propriety of the [FDR].”111 
After oral argument, the panel instructed the parties to file 
supplemental briefs on the question “whether this case should be 
heard en banc to decide if this court should abandon the [FDR], 
which prohibits private parties from intervening [as] of right as 
defendants under [FRCP] 24(a) on the merits of claims arising under 
 
107 Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011). 
108 See Plaintiffs’ Response to Recreational Groups’ Motion to Intervene at 2–3, 
Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv. (D. Idaho Dec. 23, 2008) (No. 408CV00363), 2008 
WL 5650749. 
109 Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV08-363-E-EJL, 2009 WL 453764 (D. 
Idaho Feb. 20, 2009) rev’d, 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011). 
110 See Opening Brief of Appellants Recreation Groups at 8, Wilderness Soc’y. v. U.S. 
Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (D.C.No.4:08-cv-00363-EJL), 2009 WL 
6504121. 
111 Answering Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees the Wilderness Soc’y and Prairie Falcon 
Audubon, Inc. at 3, Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(No. 09-35200), 2009 WL 6504122 at *3. 
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[NEPA].”112 The recreational groups argued that the case should be 
heard en banc.113 The plaintiffs again took no position on the 
correctness of the FDR, but argued that this case presented “a poor set 
of facts” for reviewing the Rule, because the recreational groups’ 
motion to intervene should be denied even under conventional 
intervention principles.114 The court then granted en banc review. 
Industry groups, tribes, and states filed amicus briefs urging the court 
to overturn the Rule.115 The United States filed an amicus brief 
arguing, like the plaintiffs, that this case did not present a good set of 
facts for abandoning the Rule, but also agreeing with the proposed 
intervenors that there should be no per se rule governing intervention 
in such cases.116 
The en banc court rejected the Rule. The court observed that, “[i]n 
applying a technical prohibition on intervention of right on the merits 
of all NEPA cases, it eschews practical and equitable considerations 
and ignores our traditionally liberal policy in favor of intervention.”117 
It also contrasted the FDR cases with its “consistent approval of 
intervention of right on the side of the federal defendant in cases 
asserting violations of environmental statutes other than NEPA.”118 
Finally, it noted that the Rule was inconsistent with decisions in the 
Third, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits.119 In the end, nobody spoke up for the 
Rule: not the plaintiffs, not the amici, not even Judges Mary 
Schroeder and Harry Pregerson, who had been on the panel that 
decided Portland Audubon twenty-two years earlier and who now 
joined the other judges of the en banc panel in a unanimous decision 
to overrule that case.120 
 
112 Order, Wilderness Soc’y. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 09–35200 (9th Cir. July 13, 
2010). 
113 See Supplemental Brief of Appellants Recreation Groups at 4, Wilderness Soc’y v. 
U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-35200), 2010 WL 3390278. 
114 Supplemental Brief Regarding En Banc Review at 1, Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. 
Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-35200), 2010 WL 3390279 at *2. 
115 See Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1175–76 (listing parties and counsel). 
116 Brief Amicus Curiae for the United States in Support of Appellees, Wilderness 
Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-35200), 2010 WL 
5780041. 
117 Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1179. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 1180. 
120 Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw, who had been on the panel in Wetlands Action 
Network, was also on the Wilderness Society en banc panel. 
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IV 
LESSONS LEARNED 
A. The Ninth Circuit Got It Right 
Several observations about this saga are possible. First, the Ninth 
Circuit was undoubtedly correct to abandon the Federal Defendant 
Rule. As explained by the Wilderness Society court, a per se rule 
against intervention as of right in NEPA cases was inconsistent with 
the Ninth Circuit’s approach to intervention in other cases and with 
other circuits’ approaches to intervention in NEPA cases. Given the 
generally lenient and flexible interpretation that the Ninth Circuit and 
other courts have given to FRCP 24(a), it did not make sense to single 
out this category of cases for such a bright-line rule against 
intervention. 
Indeed, in public law cases, intervention should usually be liberally 
granted. As Judge Reinhardt explained in a dissent from a denial of 
intervention in another case, unlike most issues about access to the 
courts, intervention does not create a conflict “between efficiency and 
the individual’s right of access to a federal judicial forum.”121 Instead, 
[a] liberal policy in favor of intervention serves both efficient 
resolution of issues and broadened access to the courts.  By 
allowing parties with a practical interest in the outcome of a 
particular case to intervene, we often prevent or simplify future 
litigation involving related issues; at the same time, we allow an 
additional interested party to express its views before the court.122 
These joint benefits of liberal intervention are particularly likely to 
result in the policy-laden disputes that arise under the federal 
environmental laws, including NEPA. 
None of which is to say that motions to intervene should always be 
granted in environmental cases. Potential intervenors must still 
demonstrate that they have a sufficiently direct and concrete interest 
in the case and that the government will not adequately represent their 
interests. In many cases, they will not be able to satisfy these 
requirements. 
There are also certain categories of environmental cases in which 
liberal intervention makes less sense. Michael Harris, for example, 
argues that intervention should generally be denied in cases that 
 
121 Greene v. United States, 996 F.2d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting). 
122 Id. at 980. 
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challenge federal agency rulemakings as arbitrary or capricious.123  
He notes that in these record-review cases, intervenors cannot offer 
any new factual information, which is traditionally one of the 
justifications for intervention.124 Moreover, because remand for a new 
rulemaking is generally the only remedy available, intervenors do not 
need to be heard regarding the development of “expansive, judicially 
directed remedies.”125 Instead, potential intervenors can effectively 
protect their interests, without interfering with the efficiency of the 
judicial process, by participating in the rulemaking proceeding 
itself.126 
An even stronger argument can be made that intervention should 
be disfavored in deadline suits, in which the plaintiffs allege that an 
agency has missed a statutory deadline. In the rulemaking cases that 
Harris discusses, potential intervenors may have a significant stake in 
the continued enforcement of the challenged rule. If a court vacates 
the rule and remands it for a new rulemaking, the result is a change 
from the legal status quo. In a deadline suit, by contrast, the legal 
situation remains the same until the agency carries out the required 
action. Moreover, the issues at stake in these cases are usually purely 
legal, and potential intervenors will have an opportunity to present 
their policy and factual arguments during the subsequent rulemaking. 
The argument against intervention is even stronger when the agency 
quickly reaches a settlement with the plaintiffs that imposes a 
rulemaking schedule, but leaves the ultimate outcome of the 
rulemaking to the agency—a regular occurrence in such cases. Courts 
frequently, and correctly, deny motions to intervene in these cases.127 
For example, the D.C. Circuit, which requires that intervenors have 
 
123 Michael Ray Harris, Intervention of Right in Judicial Proceedings to Review 
Informal Federal Rulemakings, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 879, 879–80 (2012). 
124 Id. at 908–09. 
125 Id. at 910. Courts do retain some discretion, however, to order remand without 
vacating the challenged rule. See generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and Great 
Expectations: Remands Without Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599 
(2004); Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion 
in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291 (2003). 
126 Harris, supra note 123, at 919–20. 
127 See, e.g., Am. Lung Ass’n v. Reilly, 962 F.2d 258, 261–62 (2d Cir. 1992); Ctr. for 
Biological Diversity v. U.S. EPA., No. C-11-06059 YGR, 2012 WL 909831 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 16, 2012); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. EPA., 274 F.R.D. 305, 311 (D.D.C. 
2011); In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig., 270 F.R.D. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 
2010); Envtl. Def. v. Leavitt, 329 F. Supp. 2d 55, 68 (D.D.C. 2004). 
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standing, recently denied intervention for lack of standing to an 
industry group in precisely these circumstances.128 
But NEPA cases do not fit this pattern. Indeed, given their nature, 
these cases are a particularly poor choice for a rule limiting 
intervention. For one thing, although NEPA cases are record-review 
cases brought pursuant to the APA, courts generally allow the record 
to be supplemented more frequently in NEPA cases than in other 
categories of cases.129 Intervenors are therefore more likely to be able 
to add relevant factual information in a NEPA case than in an APA 
challenge to an agency rulemaking. For another, NEPA cases usually 
do not involve only a government action, but also some underlying 
private action that may be enjoined from going forward if the NEPA 
analysis is struck down. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit was correct to 
reject the FDR. 
B. An Irony of Timing 
As just noted, the potential impact of NEPA litigation on private 
projects is one reason to allow liberal intervention in these cases. 
Arguably, the Rule’s limitation to the merits phase addressed this 
concern—even under the Rule, permit holders and others who would 
be harmed if the court imposed an injunction would have a chance to 
be heard at the remedial phase of the litigation. But that fact raises a 
second observation about the Wilderness Society decision. One irony 
of the timing of the decision is that the Ninth Circuit abandoned the 
FDR at almost precisely the moment when the consequences of the 
Rule were dramatically reduced. 
Recall that under the Rule, intervention as of right was forbidden 
only on the merits of a NEPA claim, not as to remedy. Under 
contemporaneous case law, however, a defendant-intervenor’s options 
at the remedial phase were limited, because courts put a strong thumb 
on the scale in favor of granting injunctions in NEPA cases. 
 
128 Defenders of Wildlife v. Perciasepe, 714 F.3d 1317, 1323–27 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(holding that the Utility Water Act Group, an industry trade association, did not have 
standing to intervene in a case in which environmentalists had challenged EPA’s failure to 
revise effluent limitations and effluent limitation guidelines and in which the plaintiffs and 
EPA had submitted a proposed consent decree establishing a schedule for rulemaking). 
129 See, e.g., Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 625 F.3d 1092, 1107 
(9th Cir. 2010); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 201 (4th 
Cir. 2009); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y. v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 15 (2d Cir. 1997); see generally 
Susannah T. French, Comment, Judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA 
Litigation, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 929 (1993). 
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In fact, some courts even held that under NEPA, an injunction 
should be an automatic remedy.130 Other courts did not go so far, but 
still presumed that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm in 
NEPA cases for purposes of the four-part test governing the 
imposition of preliminary injunctions.131 
As a result of these decisions, a potential intervenor’s ability to get 
into the case at the merits phase under the Rule would frequently have 
been of little use. If the agency lost at the merits stage, there was little 
chance that an intervenor could prevent the imposition of a 
burdensome injunction at the remedial phase. 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Winter v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.132 and Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed 
Farms,133 however, changed all of that. These cases held that the four-
part test for both preliminary and permanent injunctions applied with 
full force in NEPA cases. The Court put no thumb on the scale in 
favor of the environment; instead, it held that the plaintiff bore the 
burden on all four elements. As a result, there is now much more to 
fight for at the remedial phase of a NEPA case than there was during 
the heyday of the FDR. 
C. Even Judicial Doctrines Will Die Without Advocates 
If the Rule was always wrongheaded and its consequences are now 
reduced, why did it get abandoned when it did? A potential 
explanation emerges if one focuses on what is perhaps the most 
striking aspect of the Rule’s demise: its entirely unlamented nature. 
As indicated above, in Wilderness Society, the Rule found no 
defenders among the litigants or amici. One simple point to emerge 
from this fact is that in our adversarial system, a judicial doctrine, as 
much as a policy position, must have advocates if it is to survive. No 
advocates were to be found who would support the Rule, and thus it is 
no surprise that the Ninth Circuit abandoned it. 
Why could the Rule find no supporters? To start with, industry 
groups, property rights activists, and local governments are the 
entities most likely to move to intervene in NEPA cases, which are 
 
130 State of Cal. v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465, 498–99 (E.D. Cal. 1980), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. Cal. v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982). 
131 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (1st Cir. 1983). 
132 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
133 561 U.S. 139 (2010). 
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predominantly brought by environmentalists. As a result, it is no 
surprise that these groups opposed the FDR. 
As for environmentalists, their lack of support appears to have two 
main reasons. First, over time the Rule had evolved from one that 
virtually always benefited environmentalists and harmed industry 
groups to one that could affect both groups, if not exactly evenly. 
Because most NEPA cases are brought by environmental groups, 
before Kootenai Tribe the primary effect of the Rule had been to deny 
motions to intervene by industry groups in cases brought by 
environmentalists. This asymmetrical effect was noted and criticized 
by commentators at the time.134 But, in the late 1990s, industry groups 
and other “anti-environmentalist” plaintiffs started bringing more 
NEPA cases and, in the process, became more successful at 
overcoming the significant prudential standing barriers to such 
suits.135 
Until this time, the FDR had been applied only to such anti-
environmentalist interests. Environmentalists may therefore have 
assumed that the Rule would not be applied to them in these “NEPA 
for the Gander” cases.136 But Kootenai Tribe rejected this view, 
holding that the Rule applied to all defendant-intervenors in NEPA 
cases, whatever the basis for their interest in the case. After Kootenai, 
environmental groups, many of whom participate frequently in 
environmental litigation, realized that the Rule could be used against 
them, too. As a result, while they continued to cite the Rule as binding 
Ninth Circuit precedent when it favored them in particular cases, none 
of them were interested in defending the Rule when its continued 
validity was squarely presented by the en banc court in Wilderness 
Society. 
A second reason for environmentalists’ lack of support for the FDR 
may have been some district courts’ expansion of the Rule beyond 
NEPA. In cases under other environmental statutes, such as the ESA, 
environmentalists are more likely to find themselves attempting to 
intervene as defendants than in NEPA cases. As a result, the risk that 
the Ninth Circuit might apply the Rule more broadly to deny 
 
134 See, e.g., Erik Figlio, supra note 53. 
135 See supra text accompanying notes 54–57. The Supreme Court recently denied 
certiorari in a case that would have squarely presented the issue whether purely economic 
interests suffice for prudential standing under NEPA. Am. Independence Mines & 
Minerals Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 494 F. App’x 724, 727 (9th Cir. 2012); cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 2766 (2013). 
136 Cf. Cosco, supra note 58. 
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environmentalists’ motions to intervene provided an independent 
reason for them to abandon their support for the Rule. This fear was 
certainly reasonable, in that the case law had failed to establish a 
consistent reason for applying the Rule only to NEPA cases and not to 
other environmental cases against federal agencies. 
That left the federal government as the only possible supporter for 
the Rule. As noted above, the Department of Justice (DOJ) took the 
position in the Wilderness Society litigation that the FDR was 
inconsistent with FRCP 24(a), even though it believed that motions to 
intervene should rarely be granted. Looking beyond DOJ’s stated 
position in this one case, it is possible to imagine some reasons that it 
might not oppose the presence of intervenors in environmental 
litigation. From the government’s perspective, it can be useful to have 
someone covering your flank in litigation. For one thing, intervenors 
can present arguments that DOJ might want to make but cannot for 
political or other reasons. In addition, the presence of parties arguing 
both that the government has gone too far and that it has barely gone 
far enough can help the agency portray itself as representing a 
reasonable middle-ground—therefore making it more likely that a 
court will defer to it on matters of fact and law. 
There are also reasons that DOJ might not want intervenors in the 
case. For example, the presence of intervenors might make it more 
difficult for the government to settle the litigation if it wants to, 
although intervenors do not have an actual veto over settlements 
negotiated between the original parties.137 The freedom to settle, 
however, is arguably less important to the government in NEPA cases 
than in some other categories of cases, such as the deadline cases 
discussed above. 
In sum, the FDR was doomed because no entity that regularly 
participates in this type of litigation saw any benefit from the Rule’s 
survival. In an adversary system, a common law legal doctrine, such 
as the Rule, needs advocates if it is to survive. The Rule lost its 
environmentalist advocates after Kootenai Tribe and the district court 
decisions that expanded its application, and so its demise was 
inevitable. 
The only reason it survived as long as it did (from 2002 to 2011) 
was that courts in the Ninth Circuit continued to apply it as a matter 
of precedent. While environmental advocates may have had no 
 
137 See Local No. 93, Int’l Assoc. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v. City of Cleveland, 478 
U.S. 501, 528–30 (1986). 
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interest in supporting the Rule, they also were not free to ignore 
binding circuit precedent. The specific timing of the Rule’s overruling 
in the end depended on the court’s willingness to review it en banc. 
The observation that the FDR died in part because it had no 
advocates leads to a broader point about intervention doctrine in 
environmental cases. In NEPA actions, as in litigation against federal 
agencies involving many other environmental statutes, a large fraction 
of the litigants are repeat players. On the environmental side, 
nationwide organizations such as the Sierra Club, NRDC, 
Environmental Defense Fund, Center for Biological Diversity, and 
Earthjustice, along with many regional and local groups, regularly 
participate as both plaintiffs and defendant-intervenors in litigation 
involving federal agencies. On the other side, trade groups such as the 
National Mining Association, National Homebuilders Association, 
and Utility Air Regulatory Group, as well as property-rights and 
recreational groups such as the Pacific Legal Foundation and Blue 
Ribbon Coalition, also regularly litigate both for and against the 
government. 
Both sets of groups can expect to participate as plaintiffs in some 
cases and as defendant-intervenors in others. Knowing that any limits 
on intervention for which they advocate as plaintiffs in one case 
might be applied to exclude them from another case in the future in 
which they will move to intervene, these groups may decide not to 
oppose motions to intervene, or to oppose them less vigorously than 
they otherwise would. 
This outcome is made even more likely when one considers the 
costs and benefits of opposing a motion to intervene in these cases. 
Because most environmental cases against a federal agency are 
record-review cases,138 the additional costs imposed on plaintiffs by 
defendant-intervenors are relatively small. The cases are usually 
resolved on summary judgment and do not involve discovery. 
Therefore, in most cases the only additional costs imposed on 
plaintiffs by intervenors come from arguments on a motion to dismiss 
and/or motion for summary judgment that are not presented by the 
federal defendant. Thus the costs of allowing intervention, while real, 
 
138 Even in NEPA cases, in which—as described above—courts are more likely to 
allow supplementation of the record than in many other record-review cases, it seems 
unlikely that defendant-intervenors would frequently seek to supplement the record. The 
plaintiffs are more likely to seek supplementation in these cases, because they are the 
parties who will want evidence that does not support the agency’s decision to be before the 
court. 
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are much more manageable in these cases than in other types of civil 
litigation. 
On the other side, there can be significant costs, especially in terms 
of delay, to opposing a motion to intervene. A denial of a motion to 
intervene is generally an appealable interlocutory order,139 and district 
courts frequently stay the case or effectively stay it through protracted 
scheduling orders while the appeal of the intervention order is 
pending. As a result, even in the best-case scenario for a plaintiff—in 
which the district court denies the motion to intervene and that 
decision is upheld on appeal—the litigation can be delayed by a year 
or more. For many plaintiffs, the prospect of this sort of delay will be 
a much more significant consideration than the burden of briefing 
responses to an intervenor’s legal arguments. 
The combined effect of these incentives could be that intervention 
doctrine will tend to move in a more liberal direction than would 
otherwise be the case. Such a result would be difficult to demonstrate 
empirically, because it is not clear what would constitute the baseline 
against which to compare the current state of the doctrine.140 
Nevertheless, it seems a plausible outcome of the litigants’ incentives 
and is reflected in anecdotal evidence of plaintiffs who decline to 
oppose motions to intervene for fear of creating bad law. The 
Wilderness Society decision is merely an extreme case of this general 
phenomenon. 
D. The Paths of Common Law Doctrines 
Another perspective on the FDR focuses not on its ultimate demise 
but on the entire process through which it arose, developed, and then 
died. This progression could serve as a textbook example of the 
evolution of common law rules. In particular, it illustrates three 
perspectives on the path of the common law: Edward Levi’s three-
step description of the legal reasoning process; Carol Rose’s 
description of the alternation of rules and standards; and accounts of 
the path dependence of legal rules. 
 
139 See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 377 (1987) 
(“[W]hen an order prevents a putative intervenor from becoming a party in any respect, the 
order is subject to immediate review.”). 
140 One possibility might be to compare circuits in which environmental litigation tends 
to involve many repeat players, such as perhaps the Ninth and D.C. Circuits, against other 
circuits with a higher proportion of one-time or sporadic litigants in such cases. 
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In his classic exposition of the process of legal reasoning, Edward 
Levi identifies three stages in the history of a legal rule. “The first 
stage is the creation of the legal concept which is built up as cases are 
compared . . . . The second stage is the period when the concept is 
more or less fixed . . . . The third stage is the breakdown of the 
concept.”141 His primary example in explaining this sequence is the 
inherently dangerous rule in tort law, under which a seller of 
inherently dangerous goods could be held liable for injuries suffered 
by someone other than the buyer (in other words, the rule created an 
exception for inherently dangerous goods from the usual requirement 
that a plaintiff be in privity of contract with the defendant to recover). 
In Levi’s account, the first stage corresponded to a series of decisions 
between 1816 and 1851 in which courts struggled to develop a 
coherent approach to the issue, culminating in Longmeid v. Holliday, 
in which the English Court of Exchequer for the first time formulated 
a rule basing liability on whether the object was “an instrument in its 
nature dangerous.”142 The second stage, from 1851 to 1915, involved 
the consistent application of the Longmeid rule. Courts identified 
particular products as inherently dangerous or not, with liability to 
those not in privity turning on the answer to this question.143 Finally, 
in the 1916 New York Court of Appeals decision in MacPherson v. 
Buick, the distinction was abandoned, as the court removed the 
requirement of privity of contract for all negligence actions.144 
The FDR followed much the same pattern, if on a considerably 
more compressed time scale. First, immediately after Portland 
Audubon, it was not clear that the case stood for any particular rule; it 
was open to multiple interpretations. The Sierra Club decision four 
years later first announced the NEPA-specific FDR, thus creating the 
relevant legal concept.145 In the second stage, the rule announced in 
Sierra Club was applied consistently for close to two decades, with 
subsequent Ninth Circuit cases clarifying exactly which situations fell 
 
141 Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 506 
(1948). 
142 Id. at 509–10 (quoting 155 Eng. Rep. 752, 755 (1851)). 
143 Id. at 510–14. 
144 Id. at 514–17 (citing 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)). 
145 This fact also recalls Karl Llewellyn’s observation about “the distinction between 
the ratio decidendi, the court’s own version of the rule of the case, and the true rule of the 
case, to wit, what it will be made to stand for by another later court.” KARL N. 
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIC LECTURES ON THE LAW AND LAW 
SCHOOL 50 (Oxford University Press 2008) (1930). 
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on either side of the line that Sierra Club had drawn. Third, the Rule 
was abandoned in Wilderness Society. 
In fact, the FDR might provide a better example of this process 
than the inherently dangerous rule. As Lawrence Cunningham has 
pointed out, MacPherson did not represent so much a breakdown of 
the Longmeid rule as it did a bifurcation, in which liability continued 
to attach to inherently dangerous products, but was also expanded to 
cover other products if the manufacturer was negligent.146 Wilderness 
Society, by contrast, represented a genuine breakdown of the Rule. 
After this case, there was no per se rule excluding intervenors in 
NEPA cases or any other category of cases; instead, all motions to 
intervene as of right would be judged under the same multi-factor test. 
This abandonment of the rule-like FDR for the standard-like 
approach announced in Wilderness Society calls to mind another 
account of the cycle of legal doctrine: Carol Rose’s description of 
such doctrines are forever alternating between the bright-line clarity 
of rules (crystal) and the fuzziness of standards (mud).147 Her focus is 
on private law—in particular, on property law. In her account, private 
parties, approaching their contractual relationships ex ante, prefer 
bright-line rules establishing clear entitlements. Courts, reviewing 
cases ex post in which these clear contractual entitlements produce 
apparently unjust results because of “ninnies, hard-luck cases, and the 
occasional scoundrels who take advantage of them,”148 muddy up 
these rules with exceptions and limits. The result, as she puts it, is that 
“we see a back-and-forth pattern: crisp definition of entitlements, 
made fuzzy by accretions of judicial decisions, crisped up again by 
the parties’ contractual arrangements, and once again made fuzzy by 
the courts.”149 
Something similar happened with the FDR. As the history sketched 
out above demonstrates, Portland Audubon did not create the Rule. 
Instead, that decision relied on several factors, including not only the 
nature of the plaintiffs’ claims, but also the nature and concreteness of 
the proposed intervenors’ interests, in denying the motion to 
 
146 Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Common Law as an Iterative Process: A 
Preliminary Inquiry, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 767–68 (2006). 
147 Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 593 
(1988). 
148 Id. at 587. 
149 Id. at 585. 
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intervene.150 It was only in subsequent cases, especially Sierra Club, 
that the FDR became a per se bright-line rule.151 
Yet the very process of rendering the FDR more rule-like 
undermined its logical coherence. Why should it apply only to NEPA 
cases and not to others? Why was the nature and concreteness of the 
proposed intervenor’s interest irrelevant here when it was of central 
importance in other cases? These tensions were exposed in a series of 
inconsistent district court opinions, some expanding the Rule beyond 
its NEPA home, others taking the Ninth Circuit at its word and 
limiting it to such cases. Thus the arc of the FDR, like the trespass 
doctrines discussed by Rose, shows an originally standard-like 
approach becoming ever more rule-like over time until, undermined 
by its internal conflicts and inconsistencies, it collapses into a return 
to a standard-like approach. 
There are differences, of course, between Rose’s story and what 
happened here. Most obviously, the setting is federal civil procedure 
rather than property law. One consequence of this difference is that 
the actors who create the crystals and mud are different. Whereas in 
Rose’s account private parties establish rules that are then muddied by 
courts, here it is an appellate court that both creates the Rule from 
mud and then later rejects it, returning to the muddy standard. 
Arguably, the lower courts played a role in muddying the Rule before 
its final collapse. In any event, private parties played no direct role.152 
A third description of the common law process emphasizes its path 
dependence. Path dependence is the idea that “an outcome or decision 
is shaped in specific and systematic ways by the historical path 
leading to it.”153 This concept, or at least this terminology, derives 
from economics and sociology, where it has been used to explain such 
phenomena as the predominance of the QWERTY keyboard.154 In the 
 
150 See supra text accompanying notes 12–28. 
151 See supra text accompanying notes 29–71. 
152 Private parties’ interests regarding the rule also do not parallel those in the property 
law situation. When dealing with property law or other forms of private law, contracting 
parties should generally desire ex ante clarity, even if half of them may later want to 
benefit from fuzziness in court. When it comes to the rules governing intervention, 
however, there is no similar ex ante/ex post divide in the perceptions of private parties, at 
least regarding the form of the rule. They might have a preference for whether a rule is 
more or less favorable to intervention, but not for whether a rule is clear or vague. 
153 Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604 (2001). 
154 See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 
(1985). 
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analysis of legal doctrine, the concept of path dependence, if not the 
specific terminology, actually has a much longer history that goes 
back at least to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Holmes repeatedly 
commented upon, usually with some derision, the tendency of the 
common law to retain and adapt outdated doctrines.155 
More recently, Oona Hathaway has attempted to systematize the 
discussion of legal path dependence. In particular, she identifies three 
variants of path dependence: increasing-returns path dependence, 
which “occurs because once a court makes an initial decision, it is 
less costly to continue down that same path than it is to change to a 
different path”; evolutionary path dependence, which emphasizes that 
“[t]he possibilities for today and tomorrow are determined by the 
evolutionary changes of the past”; and sequencing path dependence, 
which is based on the insight of rational choice theory that “the 
sequence in which alternatives are considered can decisively 
influence the outcome.”156 
The history of the FDR exemplifies both the increasing-returns and 
sequencing forms of path dependence. The key point here is the role 
of the Sierra Club decision. As indicated above, the Portland 
Audubon decision could have been explained in several ways. When, 
several years later, the Sierra Club court was faced with a motion to 
intervene in a CWA case, it could have distinguished Portland 
Audubon on multiple grounds. Instead, it focused on one aspect of 
Portland Audubon: it was a NEPA case. 
Once this Rule had been defined, it determined the path of 
subsequent cases. Courts in later FDR cases had alternative bases for 
denying intervention available to them, including the insufficient 
directness of the intervenors’ interests or a prudential standing-like 
disconnect between the intervenors’ interests and the interests 
 
155 See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35 (Dover 
Publications 1991) (1881) (“[J]ust as the clavicle in the cat only tells of the existence of 
some earlier creature to which a collar-bone was useful, precedents survive in the law long 
after the use they once served is at an end and the reason for them has been forgotten.”); 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) (“It 
is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the 
time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down 
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.”). 
See generally Clayton P. Gillette, The Path Dependence of the Law, in THE PATH OF THE 
LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 245 (Steven J. 
Burton ed. 2000). 
156 Hathaway, supra note 3, at 607–08. 
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protected by the statute.157 Instead, thanks to Sierra Club’s 
formulation of a NEPA-specific rule, those later courts followed the 
FDR path rather than any of the other avenues open to them. These 
decisions can be regarded as a form of increasing-returns path 
dependence; it was easier for a court to apply an applicable bright-line 
rule than to work through a multi-factor test or to develop a rule in an 
unsettled area of the law.158 
The critical role played by Sierra Club also highlights that the 
history of the FDR represents a form of sequencing path dependence. 
As just noted, some of the FDR cases could have been decided on 
other grounds. If these cases had occurred before Sierra Club, the 
court might well have decided them on different grounds because it 
would not have had the cost-reducing option of relying on Sierra 
Club’s bright-line rule available to it. 
The particular timing of Kootenai Tribe may also have played a 
role. The doctrine already had a decade to get locked in before it was 
first applied to environmental groups. If environmental groups had 
been denied intervention on this basis earlier, the Rule may have 
faced more opposition earlier in its development. 
Michael Gerhardt has criticized accounts of path dependence as 
impossible to prove.159 It is always a risk in historical analysis that 
one will find causation where there was only correlation, making up 
“Just So Stories” to describe spurious relationships between 
phenomena.160 One cannot restart the clock of history to run 
controlled experiments. So too here the idea that the formulation of 
 
157 For example, the briefing in Churchill County shows that the putative intervenors 
had only indirect and contingent interests in the outcome of the litigation. See supra text 
accompanying note 46. 
158 As Michael Gerhardt has noted, the more rule-like a doctrine, “the more strongly it 
imposes path dependency.” MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 98 
(2008). This form of path dependence emerges not only because it is easier for courts to 
apply the existing rule, but also because litigants will tailor their arguments to the new 
precedent. See Hathaway, supra note 153, at 628 (“[W]hen a new precedent emerges, 
litigants will react to the precedent in ways that further reinforce and contribute to the path 
indicated by that new precedent.”). 
159 “The second prerequisite for path dependency is sequentialism. Sequentialism 
requires the order in which the Court decides cases to influence outcomes . . . . It is, 
however, impossible to prove sequentialism determines specific outcomes. It is pure 
speculation whether the Court would have ruled differently if it were to have decided some 
cases in a different sequence.” Gerhardt, supra note 158, at 86. 
160 See, e.g., Stephen J. Gould, Sociobiology: The Art of Storytelling, 80 NEW 
SCIENTIST 530 (1978). 
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the Rule depended on the specific sequence of Portland Audubon 
followed by Sierra Club is only a hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, there are some reasons to believe that the path 
followed by the FDR cases shaped the development of the doctrine. 
First, as noted above, courts had alternative grounds for decision 
making available to them. While the NEPA versus CWA distinction 
was the most straightforward distinction available to the Sierra Club 
court, if another case had come before the Ninth Circuit, another basis 
for analogizing or distinguishing Portland Audubon may well have 
been easier for the court to adopt. Second, two of the three judges on 
the Portland Audubon panel were among the judges who voted to 
reject the Rule in Wilderness Society, suggesting that the final form of 
the Rule was not envisioned by the Portland Audubon court. 
As a final observation, it is worth noting that path dependence is 
particularly likely to occur among intermediate appellate courts such 
as the federal courts of appeal. Unlike the highest court in a 
jurisdiction, which is always free to overrule itself, circuit court 
panels cannot overrule a prior decision by another panel. Instead, as 
happened in Wilderness Society, the court must decide to convene en 
banc before it can reverse any precedent. This additional barrier for 
any litigant seeking reversal of a precedent makes it especially likely 
that the decision taken by an early panel, whose composition may not 
be representative of the court as a whole, will fix the path for 
subsequent doctrinal developments. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Defendant Rule was a mistaken attempt to limit 
intervention in NEPA litigation in the Ninth Circuit. That court was 
correct to ultimately abandon the Rule. Yet its saga carries lessons 
both for the role of intervention in environmental litigation and for the 
processes by which common law rules change through time. 
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